

Ex. # 1342

Document No. 2622-A

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Certificate

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first lieutenant R.N.I.A., Head of the War Crimes Section of NETHEPLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed original document entitled:

Statement of A.F.P. HULSEWE, Lieut. P.N.N.R., dated Batavia, June 22, 1946, concerning the BANDOENG-ultimatum, has been taken from the official records of the NEFIS.

Signature:

C. JONGENEEL

(SEAL) - NEFIS

Batavia, June 25th, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K.A. DE WEERD, LL.D., first lieutenant R.N.I.A., Senior Official attached to the office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

(signed) K. A. de Weerd

Statement

of A.F.P. Hulsewe, Lieutenant, Royal Netherlands Navy Reserve, special service branch:

The witness duly sworn states:

"My name is Anthony Francois Paulus HULSEWE, I am Netherlander by nationality. I am 36 years of age; my permanent home is Batavia, where I am living at present."

"My civil occupation before having been inducted into military service, was staff member of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs (Japanese section) of the N.E.I. Government, concurrently lecturer-extraordinary in Chinese and cultural history"

of the Far East. Dates of appointment: 1922 language student at Leyden University, Holland, 1931 language student in China and Japan, 1935 staff member, 1940 reader in cultural history, 1941 lecturer-extraordinary.

On February 22, 1942, as a naval ratings, second reserve, untrained, I was called up for service with the Royal Navy, with orders to report to the Navy Department at Bandoeng. I reported there on 23 February and was attached to a section of the War Office, under the direct orders of Commander L. Brouwer, R.N. (at present in Tokyo, Japan). On 2 March I was commissioned as sub-lieutenant, Royal Naval Reserve, Special Service Branch.

On 6th March at approx. 22.00 hrs. I was summoned by my colleague of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs, H. HAGENAAR (at present in Holland) to attach myself immediately to the suite of His Excellency the Governor General of the N.E.I., where I duly reported. The next morning I informed the War Office.

On 7th March at approx. 15.30 hrs. the Governor General and his suite moved from the Resident's house to a villa on a hillside on the outskirts of Bandoeng, after a Japanese bombing attack, during which bombs had fallen on all sides of the Resident's house.

During the early part of the morning of 8 March there were several Japanese planes continuously over Bandoeng. Because of the danger of air attack - I do not remember whether any bombs were actually dropped; in any case not in our vicinity - the Governor General and most of his suite (I amongst them) were in the very large and commodious air raid shelter built deep into the hillside. The shelter was connected by telephone. I presume at that time I must have learned that during the night talks had been started between the Netherlands Indies forces holding Bandoeng and the Japanese, who had broken through at Lembang; these talks were at that moment proceeding at Villa Isola, on the road to Lembang. Shortly before 10.00 hrs the Governor General was required on the telephone and from his remarks we understood that his presence had been demanded by the Japanese at the abovementioned talks. The Governor General refused, stating that his presence was definitely not needed in talks concerning the surrender of a single locality such as the Bandoeng area. Soon afterwards the Governor General was again wanted on the telephone and this time he was informed

that the Japanese absolutely demanded his presence, at Soebang however, and that unless he complied with this demand immediately Bandoeng town was to be bombed. Under these circumstances the Governor General felt that he could not but give in. - (I heard later from somebody who had been present at Villa Isola, that as soon as the Governor General's consent had become known there a Japanese officer who had shown signs of great nervousness, rushed to the wide lawn and laid out a signal sheet pattern, ordering the Japanese bombers not to attack).

The Governor General left the villa immediately afterwards. He was accompanied by his two aides Lieut. Col. L. LANZING R.N. I.A., and Lt. Commander H. Baron VAN TILL, R.N., the Secretary General KIVERON, the Chef de Cabinet Dr. F. IDENBURG, the staff-member of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs H. HAGENAAR, and myself. We were joined - I presume right at the villa - by the C-in-C Royal N.E.I. Army, Lieut. Gen. H. TER POORTEN and his suite in several motorcars, the General's car driving in front and carrying the white flag. At Villa Isola two cars with Japanese military joined us. After a difficult trip we arrived at Soebang.

At Soebang we waited for some time in the cars, to be told eventually that the Governor General was expected at the airfield Kali Djati, so we went there.

At Kali Djati our party were made to wait in the airfield's sergeants' mess, where we were joined by a number of Japanese officers, amongst them the G.O.C. Airforces, who made a fiery speech commemorating Japan's victory. After considerable time, two hours at least, the Governor General was asked to choose a small number of people to accompany him at the coming talks, as there would not be sufficient space to accommodate the whole N.E.I. party. Eventually we proceeded to a married officers' quarters close by.

The talks were held in the dining room; the front room was filled with newspaper reporters and moving picture people and the communicating double doors were wide open. The Governor General sat facing Lieut. Gen. IMAMURA; at his right hand Lt. Gen. TER POORTEN, I do not remember the seating of Maj. Gen. BANKERS (Chief of Staff) and Maj. Gen. PESMAN (G.O.C. Bandoeng area). Behind the chairs Messrs. Kiveron, Idenburg and myself - possibly also Mr. Hagenaar, were left standing. On Lt. Gen. IMAMURA's right was his Chief of Staff, on his left the G.O.C. Airforces. Behind their chairs there stood a considerable number of Japanese officers, at least twenty.

The talks must have started about 16.30 hrs. I have no clear recollection of the exact sequence of the questions and answers, nor of course of their complete contents. However, this was my first attempt at interpreting and I found it uncommonly difficult, particularly as Lt. Gen. INAMURA persisted in quoting a draft, written in the usual high flown style, more easily read than understood. The result was that after about ten minutes I was floundering so badly that a Japanese left the ranks behind the General's chairs and offered to take over and was permitted to do so; he was T. MIYOSHI, formerly of the Japanese Consulate General at Batavia.

The first question was, whether the Governor General as C-in-C of the N.E.I. sea, land and air forces had come to submit the surrender of these forces. The answer took some time, as it gave rise to several new questions. The short of it was: no, he had come because he had been summoned to be present at talks concerning the surrender of Bandoeng, with the threat that this town was to be destroyed by aerial bombing in case he did not appear. Furthermore he was unable - willingness apart - to hand in any surrender terms, as his constitutional powers as commander-in-chief of the N.E.I. Forces had been expressly cancelled by the Netherlands Government a few days previously. The reply to these statements was, that the Japanese were not going to let themselves be tricked by a piece of political skull-duggery and that in their eyes the Governor General still was the C-in-C of the N.E.I. Forces.

The next point was: surrender of the N.E.I. Forces. The Governor General maintained that he had been summoned in connection with the surrender of Bandoeng only. This question was entered into at some length. The Japanese made two points:  
1. Bandoeng was only of small importance, it was theirs for the taking, as the outer defences had already been smashed; two or three days more would see them in the town.  
2. The G.O.C. Airforces insisted that the surrender of Bandoeng - town or area - would be useless, as air reconnaissance had shown considerable bodies of N.E.I. troops withdrawing into the difficult mountain area around the Bandoeng plateau.

The upshot of these discussions was the renewed demand of the Japanese C-in-C that the Governor General tender the unconditional surrender of all N.E.I. forces, the demand now accompanied by the threat that unless he complied, Bandoeng was to be bombed flat.

After some more talk the unconditional surrender was agreed to, with two or three days grace for troops in outlying areas. The whole proceedings were verbal; I do not remember the Governor General signing any document.

At this stage the Governor General and his personal suite - i.e. Messrs. KIVERON and IDENBURG (PAGENAAR?) and I - were told to leave the room and wait outside; purely military matters were going to be arranged with the generals alone.

After about three quarters of an hour's waiting under the eaves of the house in the drizzling rain, we left together for the sergeants' mess and immediately afterwards for Bandoeng, accompanied by a truck with Japanese engineers to help us across the difficult patches in the road. We arrived back in Bandoeng at approx. 00.30 hrs, March 9, 1942.

Signature: A. F. P. HULSEWÉ

Sworn and subscribed before me K.A. de Weerd, LL.D., first lieutenant R.N.I.A., senior official attached to the Office of the Attorney General N.E.I. this 22nd day of June, 1946.

Signature: K. A. de Weerd

證明

左記署名者滿印陸軍中尉 [文一久・ヨシハラ・ヒロ] 和爾軍情報部員  
犯課長官宣誓之次處添附，原本書類即 [八・九・二・一] 一九四六年昭和二十一年  
六月三日附 [八・九・二・一] 之後遺失。此件已和爾軍備海軍大尉 [一・二・七・一]  
合 [一・二・七・一] 陳述書旨和爾軍情報部公文記錄存 [一・二・七・一] 情報部存于十二  
月三日證明。

昭和二十一年六月三日  
文一久・ヨシハラ・ヒロ署名



本書〔滿洲印度總督〕給長寧滿洲國馬光佐官史滿印陸軍中尉  
名稱者〔一・二・七・一〕法子博士面前於署名會見於二十一年。

文一久・ヨシハラ・ヒロ署名

本書〔和爾軍備海軍特種勤務部〕〔一・二・七・一〕大尉供述書〔一・二・七・一〕  
本證人宣誓上左〔一・二・七・一〕陳述。

本證人宣誓上左〔一・二・七・一〕本證人宣誓上左〔一・二・七・一〕本年  
三十六。本籍地〔一・二・七・一〕自介：現在居住于本心。

軍務三服〔前職業〕滿印政府〔宋至后日本課〕課員兼支那語亞東亞  
文史特別講師〔外文略歷〕一九三八年和爾軍備海軍大學，語學生。

一九三九年支那及日本於語學生。一九三五年課員一九四一年文化講師  
一九四一年特別講師。

一九四二年十二月三日海軍中佐〔滿印軍備木教練水兵〕〔和爾海軍〕招集〔一・二・七・一〕  
海軍會出頭命令〔一・二・七・一〕。一月三日出頭〔和爾軍備〕〔一・二・七・一〕  
海軍中佐〔一・二・七・一〕直母指揮〔一・二・七・一〕。〔同人：現在日本今東京居。〕  
〔一・二・七・一〕海軍軍備特種勤務部〔和爾軍備〕〔一・二・七・一〕。

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廿六日二時派和事廳局同僚二十二人公十一號<sup>同此</sup>現駐和諧三號<sup>此</sup>等上  
坐下即時傳與某印鑑於會商下隨員二十人等即行早退出頭門。  
其事<sup>報</sup>本處事<sup>聞</sup>該軍省<sup>報</sup>。

三月廿二日，余與張君及陸頭人往食於外，小山亭在北側，  
有日本竹、櫻花數株，及日本松、柏、柏木盆景，櫻花盆中，根葉食，而  
同落地上。

三月八日、早朝由火船、日本施行機（總大將）市、工室三等少空襲、危険  
が止む。尤ニ爆彈效果、甚強、火船、機械、記憶、皆居不・然、何以至也  
矣、斯人、若ナガリ也！ 俗智及其、道員、大部令（其中、私居也）！  
小山傾斜面、深谷、構築甚、非常大、萬、都念、出来、防空壕、内  
入、是也！ 此防空壕、電路、連絡、甚、是時、機子、推測、之、是也  
！ 其晚、電話、「火船、準備、已、廢、印拿、」火船、破、日本空、向  
云、船、之、火船、之、廢、其、待、之、等、連絡、火船、之、通、火船、道、路、制、于、火  
船、之、火船、之、廢、其、待、之、等、連絡、火船、之、通、火船、道、路、制、于、火  
船、之、火船、之、廢、其、待、之、等、連絡、火船、之、通、火船、道、路、制、于、火  
船、之、火船、之、廢、其、待、之、等、連絡、火船、之、通、火船、道、路、制、于、火  
船、之、火船、之、廢、其、待、之、等、連絡、火船、之、通、火船、道、路、制、于、火

總督、之子桂炮、之曰久江、之、如中單士六地方、降大國、之對談、於之船、出之、人明、之、不必要、手、其、下、向、七、工、變、晉、八、再、度、電、語、曰、出、之、得、軍、本、十、之、九、三、今、度、日本、軍、方、斷、半、之、被、之、二、八、八、八、未、化、樣、之、老、之、被、之、即、時、此、軍、就、處、之、不、滿、合、之、以、所、爆、擊、軍、之、四、千、四、日、之、浦、告、半、之。

狀勢斯時和乃外宇經督公恩服之日本之國事（和乃外宇經督公恩服之日本之國事）

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總督「」即刻到來。總督、總督府軍、陸軍佐  
將「」及海軍少佐「」各一人，總督府軍、陸軍佐  
將「」同僚。其餘「」書記官  
長「」內閣官房長「」一個「」博士東亞局幹部「」  
及和「」總督「」多分兩組。總督、總督府軍司令官「」  
中將及教官、自動車二分乘車及隨員共一輛「」。總督、自動車司令  
旗揚下（備火頭）走「」，別御「」日本軍、參唐「」、自動  
車「」參加。

難儀之路地「」、「」、「」到處。

「」、「」、「」自動車内待唐「」總督、出頭場所  
「」、「」飛行場「」上告「」、「」其處「」行。

「」、「」於「」一行、飛行場、軍曹集會所待候。三者半，  
日本軍將校達十輛「」其三「」飛行隊司令官室「」。總督「」日本勝  
利，總督「」總督「」可成時間「」經過「」。一十分已三時間  
總督「」會談「」總督「」可半數人「」總督「」命也「」。  
也「」、「」總督「」行全部「」是「」樣「」水場所「」總督「」  
「」。總督「」近「」既會樹木、宿舍「」行。

會談食堂「」行「」表「」，部屋「」斯「」記者映圓保人「」充滿  
之室向「」双方一杯「」。放「」不「」總督、參謀官、中將「」向合也三席  
主客右「」。中將坐着「」居「」。午後「」小村（參謀長）  
及「」少將（「」總理司令官）到座「」居「」。方和「」雙手不  
「」之等椅「」。午後「」行「」成及命令「」。午後「」會談  
多知「」不說「」其「」。午後「」小村中將右「」參謀長、總督「」飛行隊司  
令官室「」總督、總督「」相會。日本將校「」三席「」少「」午  
各位「」居「」。會談「」六時三十分始「」。和「」問題正確无

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次者ハキリハ提出セズ、從テ勿論其完全化の内容付モ提出セズ。  
然レ下から之ハ私ノ御通譯ヲアリ並ニ三十ヶ難儀コトアリ。殊ニ  
村中將ハ通例高尚之字体行書カシ、意味ヲ解スルモノハ口讀ウリ、  
方が容易ト草体ノ用事ヲ言葉ハシテ困難ナリ久其結果約十  
今後非非常ニヨリ出ハシム時余者彼等隊列中一人日本人  
ガ出了来テ第一代アラヤヒ申出テハ、許可ナシ。其一人以前  
ハタゞ日本總領事館居テソニ三射式アリ。

(次頁)

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第一問題、蘭領東印度、海陸空軍、司令長官トニス總督、  
之等三軍、降伏ヲ申達<sup>スル事</sup>リヤ否ヤト云フテアリ。之對心  
返答ハ之二問題、即ち終焉、新之問題<sup>ス</sup>出<sup>ス</sup>未<sup>シ</sup>テ暫<sup>ク</sup>時間<sup>ス</sup>  
カ<sup>シ</sup>タリ、返答ヲ要約<sup>ス</sup>ハ、否<sup>ス</sup>、彼<sup>ノ</sup>出<sup>ス</sup>未<sup>シ</sup>ハ万般<sup>ノ</sup>事<sup>ス</sup>、  
テ未<sup>シ</sup>バ空爆<sup>ス</sup>依<sup>リ</sup>テ此町<sup>ヲ</sup>潰滅<sup>ス</sup>ト成<sup>ル</sup>、彼<sup>ノ</sup>是<sup>ノ</sup>下<sup>シ</sup>  
降伏<sup>ス</sup>原因<sup>ス</sup>會議誤<sup>ハ</sup>呼<sup>ビ</sup>出<sup>シ</sup>タラニテアリ。更<sup>ニ</sup>意志<sup>ス</sup>有無<sup>ス</sup>別<sup>シ</sup>、  
彼<sup>ノ</sup>蘭領東印度軍、總司令官トニス總督法上、權限<sup>ス</sup>二、三日  
以前<sup>ニ</sup>和蘭政府<sup>ニ</sup>依<sup>リ</sup>、明白<sup>ス</sup>解消<sup>ス</sup>サ<sup>シ</sup>爲<sup>ス</sup>彼<sup>ノ</sup>如何<sup>シ</sup>降伏條  
件<sup>ス</sup>、提供<sup>ス</sup>ハ未<sup>タ</sup>ク<sup>リ</sup>、此<sup>ニ</sup>陳述<sup>ス</sup>三討<sup>ス</sup>日本側、返事<sup>ス</sup>、  
日本側<sup>ハ</sup>か<sup>シ</sup>一片、政治的<sup>ス</sup>藝術<sup>ス</sup>二種<sup>ノ</sup>ヲ<sup>シ</sup>納<sup>ム</sup>セ<sup>リ</sup>、彼<sup>ノ</sup>  
算<sup>ス</sup>、目<sup>リ</sup>テハ總督<sup>ス</sup>今モ尙木蘭領東印度軍、總司令長官トニ  
ト見テオル<sup>ス</sup>云々在<sup>リ</sup>。

次<sup>ス</sup>、其六、全蘭領東印度軍、降伏問題<sup>ス</sup>ナリ。總督ハ自  
分軍事二科一下士<sup>ス</sup>、降伏問題<sup>ス</sup>蘭<sup>ス</sup>テ<sup>ス</sup>召喚<sup>ス</sup>テ<sup>ス</sup>アヒ<sup>ス</sup>主  
張<sup>ス</sup>。此問題<sup>ス</sup>相當長<sup>ク</sup>時間<sup>ス</sup>要<sup>リ</sup>。日本側<sup>ハ</sup>ニ<sup>シ</sup>二、三  
主張<sup>ス</sup>。(一)ハシト<sup>ス</sup>、重委任<sup>ス</sup>、微<sup>シ</sup>化モ<sup>シ</sup>道<sup>キ</sup>ス。既<sup>ニ</sup>  
外部、所<sup>レ</sup>陣地<sup>ハ</sup>破<sup>ル</sup>碎<sup>ル</sup>キ<sup>ス</sup>、勿<sup>シ</sup>アヒ<sup>ス</sup>日本側<sup>ハ</sup>  
當<sup>リ</sup>ニ<sup>シ</sup>モ<sup>リ</sup>モ<sup>リ</sup>アヒ<sup>ス</sup>ト<sup>ス</sup>、二、三日不<sup>シ</sup>同町内<sup>ニ</sup>日本軍<sup>ヲ</sup>  
見<sup>シ</sup>テアリ<sup>ス</sup>。(二)飛行隊司令官ハ、ハシト<sup>ス</sup>、町入<sup>ス</sup>地方<sup>モ</sup>  
、降伏<sup>ス</sup>モ<sup>リ</sup>問題<sup>ス</sup>アリ。何<sup>ト</sup>アヘ<sup>ス</sup>空<sup>ス</sup>、偵察<sup>ス</sup>係<sup>ス</sup>相当多<sup>ス</sup>、  
且<sup>ニ</sup>蘭領東印度部隊<sup>ハ</sup>ハシト<sup>ス</sup>高地<sup>、</sup>周圍<sup>ニ</sup>在<sup>リ</sup>嶮阻<sup>ス</sup>小谷  
地帶<sup>ハ</sup>限<sup>ル</sup>却<sup>シ</sup>ハシト<sup>ス</sup>判明<sup>ス</sup>、居心<sup>ス</sup>ト<sup>ス</sup>主張<sup>ス</sup>。

是等<sup>ノ</sup>計議<sup>ス</sup>、結果<sup>ス</sup>日本軍司令官、總督、全蘭領東  
印度軍、無<sup>シ</sup>條件<sup>ス</sup>降伏<sup>ス</sup>可<sup>シ</sup>ト<sup>ス</sup>新規要本ト<sup>ス</sup>。

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五、彼之應セサルニ於テハバントニハ對然、爆轟ナル可シト、威嚇  
伴合タ

尚木暫ク討議ヲ重キ後、外部ハ外部諸地方ニ在ル部隊  
、タミ二、三日猶餘付テ以テ無條件降伏が承諾ナク、本會議全  
部口頭ノミテナク、總督ガ何レカ、書類ニ署名シテ有無ヤ松  
記憶ニ居テ。

此段階ニ於テ總督ト其隨員即チ「モロコシ氏」  
「デンドルグ」氏（ハーベー・デンドルグ）及松一郎部屋ヲ出テ室外  
テ待ツヤウ告ダニタ、純然タル軍事上、事項ハ將官ノミ、開戦處  
理セシトシタノデアル。

霧雨ガ降ルテ居タ、軒下テ約四十五分モ待テタ後、吾々ハ一議締  
ニ至ラケテ軍曹集会所ノ方へ行キ間モ少々、同下山へ向ケタが  
日本人技士、乗ツテオイル貨物自動車ガ同行シテ道路上、困難  
ナ箇所ヲ通ル時吾々ヲ援ケテ立タ  
吾々ハ一九四二年昭和十七年三月廿四日午前零時二十一分頃八百  
人ノ帰着シタ。

二一、二二、二三、二七、二八、署名

右ハ一九四六年昭和三十一年六月二十二日、蘭領東印度檢  
事總長事務所所属、先任官吏名法宇博士、蘭印陸軍  
中尉「トマス・ウヰーリド」、面前ニ於テ宣誓、上記  
述セルモノナリ。

トマス・ウヰーリド署名

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